I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, I thank my colleague

from Arizona.

The amendment of the Senator from

West Virginia which is before us would

terminate, 12 months after the date of

enactment of the underlying joint resolution,

the authorization given in that

resolution. In other words, it would put

a time limit of a year subject to extension,

but, nonetheless, a time limit for

a year on the authorization provided in

the underlying resolution.

I say to my colleagues respectfully,

this amendment is unprecedented and

unwise. It is unprecedented in the

sense that in brief research overnight,

I have not been able to find an occasion

in which Congress has exercised authority

with regard to military action

under article I of the Constitution

when Congress has attached a time

limit to it.

There was one occasion when time

limits were discussed with regard to

the deployment of American forces in

Bosnia, the Balkans, during the nineties,

but I think we saw there why congressional

imposition of time limits on

authorization of military action is unwise.

Why is it unwise? It is unwise because

it gives notice to our enemies

that there is a limit to the authority

we are giving the President as Commander

in Chief of our military forces.

It allows them to calculate their actions

based on that limited duration.

In Bosnia, when that deadline was articulated

by the administration, it created

expectations which were quite

naturally frustrated and therein created

a credibility gap.

There is a deadline in the underlying

resolution, and the deadline is what it

ought to be and always has been for

military actions in which the Armed

Forces of the United States have been

involved. The authorization ends when

the mission is accomplished, and in

this case the authorization would end

when the two missions stated were accomplished:

When the President as

Commander in Chief concluded that

America was adequately protected, our

national security was adequately protected

from threats from Iraq, and that

the relevant United Nations resolutions

were adequately being enforced.

That is the deadline.

If the mood of Congress should

change, if the attitude of the public

should change, Congress always reserves,

as it has shown in the past, the

power of the purse and the power to

change its opinion. But this amendment

at this time, as we try to gather

our strength and unity of purpose to

convince the international community

to join with us, as they surely will, is

to finally get Saddam Hussein to keep

his promise to disarm at the end of the

gulf war.

We need no limitations on authority.

We need to speak with a clear voice. As

it says in the Bible, if the sound of the

trumpet be uncertain, who shall follow?

And if we put a 12-month time

limit on the authority of the underlying

resolution, I fear that fewer will

follow and the result will be much less

than we want it to be.

I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. President, I

thank the majority leader for his gracious

yielding of time. I thank him for

more than that. I thank him for his

leadership in this matter of how the

Senate should proceed with regard to

Iraq, and I thank him specifically for

the work that he and his staff did in

negotiations with the White House and

with Members of the House to get this

resolution to where it is where I am

confident it can and will enjoy broad

bipartisan support.

There will be time for debate later in

the day about the relevance of this resolution,

about the extent to which I am

confident it is clearly within our constitutional

authority under article I. I

have comparisons to other declarations

of war and authorizations of military

action, that is, if anything, more specific

than most.

I am inspired by Senator BYRD’s reference

to Nathan Hale. Nathan Hale

was not only a son of Connecticut, but

a Yale man. For my entire freshman

year, I walked by an inspiring statue of

Nathan Hale. I read about him. I studied

him. I cannot say I knew him personally,

but I feel as if I knew Nathan

Hale, who was remembered for saying:

‘‘I regret I have only one life to give for

my country.’’

Nathan Hale was a patriot, and he

was prepared to give his life for the security

and freedom of his country. I am

absolutely confident that if Nathan

Hale were in the Senate of the United

States today, he would not only be cosponsoring

this resolution, he would be

impatient to have the talking stop and

the action begin.

Is it time? Are we ready? Time is

what it is about.

It is 12 years since Iraq invaded Kuwait

and threatened to invade Saudi

Arabia and thereby showed that all

that Saddam Hussein had been saying

about wanting to make Baghdad the

capital of the Arab world and dominate

the Arab world was not just talk; he

was prepared to act on it.

It is 12 years since U.N. Resolution

678 authorizing the use of force against

Iraq.

It is 11 years since the congressional

authorization for Desert Storm and the

triumphant brilliant effort of our military

in Desert Storm.

It is 11 years since Saddam asked for

a cease-fire and accepted the inspection

regime as part of that cease-fire

on which he has never followed through

and complied.

It is 11 years since the no-fly zones

were first adopted and began to be enforced

by American military personnel.

It is 9 years since the U.N. found Saddam

in ‘‘material breach of his international

obligations.’’

It is 9 years since Iraq under Saddam

Hussein attempted to assassinate

former President Bush.

It is 6 years since Saddam crushed

Kurdish and Shi’a resistance to his regime.

It is 4 years since Saddam ejected inspectors

and President Clinton ordered

Operation Desert Fox, an air campaign

against Iraq in response to this act.

It is 4 years since this Senate called

for the indictment of Saddam as a war

criminal.

It is 4 years since the Senate found

Iraq in breach of international obligations

and authorized the President to

take ‘‘appropriate action in accordance

with the Constitution and relevant

laws of the United States to bring Iraq

into compliance with its international

obligation.’’

It is 4 years since Congress passed

and President Clinton signed the Iraq

Liberation Act.

It is more than 1 year since we were

attacked by terrorists on September 11,

2001, showing us the risks of inaction

against those who would arm and

threaten us.

It is 1 month since the President of

the United States challenged the

United Nations to act against this

international lawbreaker.

It is 8 days since we started the debate

on this resolution in the Senate;

excluding the Sabbath, 6 days. The

Lord made Heaven and Earth in 6 days.

It is time now for us to come to a conclusion.

Is it time? Are we ready to act? I

think the record shows we are ready to

act.

I thank the Chair, and I yield the

floor.

Mr. President, I

rise to oppose the amendment offered

by my friend, the Senator from Michigan.

It seems to me, as I look at this

amendment, that the difference we

have—those of us who have sponsored

the underlying resolution, and the Senator

from Michigan and others sponsoring

the amendment—is over tactics,

not objectives. Perhaps we should acknowledge

one to the other. We each

have the objective, I believe, to compel

Saddam Hussein to comply with the

various U.N. Security Council resolutions,

and in that sense, particularly,

to disarm.

I suggest to my friend from Michigan,

noting how he continues to refer

to his amendment as the multilateral

approach, that those who sponsored the

underlying resolution consider ours to

be a multilateral international approach

as well. We believe our willingness

not only to accept and urge and

encourage the President to go to the

United Nations and hope the United

Nations will authorize use of force if

Saddam Hussein does not comply with

their resolutions but our willingness

after that fact to say if that does not

happen, the President has the right to

utilize America’s Armed Forces for

that purpose, is probably the better

way to achieve an international action

against Iraq under Saddam Hussein. To

show our willingness, our seriousness

to use military force to lead an international

coalition ourselves is the better

way to convince the United Nations

to take action on its own and therefore

to have an international act.

There is a disagreement about tactics.

The disagreement is whether we

should do all this in one resolution, as

we have, or, as the Senator from Michigan

proposes in the amendment, to

have two steps: First, go to the United

Nations, only allow enforcement, particularly

of the resolutions concerning

Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, to

be done by the United States with the

permission of the United Nations. If

that does not work, the President must

come back for a separate resolution.

Last night in a colloquy with the

Senator from Michigan, I suggested

that his resolution does in fact give the

Security Council a veto over the President’s

determination, the President’s

capacity, to use the American military

to enforce certainly those resolutions

having to do with weapons of mass destruction

and ballistic missiles and related

facilities.

It seems to me, notwithstanding the

fact that the Senator’s amendment affirms

the President’s inherent right to

use military force in self-defense, section

4(a) also makes clear the President

of the United States can only do

that if he wants to take action to destroy

or remove or render harmless

Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, nuclear

weapons, fissile material, ballistics,

et cetera, pursuant to a resolution

of the U.N. Security Council.

That means any member of the Security

Council—Russia, China, France,

any temporary member—can veto action

by the United States, by the Commander

in Chief. I don’t want that to

happen.

The question is, Why assume, if the

United Nations does not take action,

the United States will have to go it

alone? Having gone to the United Nations,

having made our case, the fact is

if military action is necessary, the

United States will never have to go

alone. We will have allies in Europe, allies

in the Middle East, who see our seriousness

of purpose, who share in our

desire to protect themselves and the

world from Saddam Hussein, who will

come to our side. We will have what we

called in the case of Kosovo a coalition

of the willing.

The Kosovo case is instructive on

several points raised in this debate.

There was no United Nations resolution

authorizing the United States to

deploy forces in the case of Kosovo because

everyone, including the Clinton

administration, the President, determined

we would possibly be subject to

a Russian veto at the Security Council.

The President was unwilling to accept

that. There was no congressional resolution

then organizing the deployment

of our forces because there was controversy

about that. There was clearly

no imminent threat of a sudden direct

attack against the United States, as in

other amendments that have been before

the Senate, because this was happening

in the Balkans. But the President

of the United States, President

Clinton, clearly understood what was

happening there was wrong. He wanted

to take action not only to stop the

genocide and prevent a wider war in

Europe but in the most distant threat,

to prevent a potential threat to the security

of the United States, so he

formed a coalition of willing nations.

Here the threat from Iraq under Saddam

Hussein is much more imminent

to the United States. So to subject our

capacity to defend ourselves against

that threat to a veto by the United Nations

Security Council is inappropriate

and wrong.

Again, I state a great phrase from

the Bible: If the sound of the trumpet

is uncertain, who will follow into battle?

If we sound a certain trumpet with

this resolution, which this amendment

would make uncertain, then many

other nations will follow us into battle.

I oppose the amendment.

I thank the Senator

from Delaware very much.

I want to ask my friend from Michigan

or my friend from Maryland to explain

how you relate two parts of the

Levin amendment. One, yes, does say

you affirm the right of the U.S. to selfdefense,

but then, two sections lower,

it seems to me, you cut a very big exception,

and you say ‘‘pursuant.’’ And

because you say ‘‘pursuant,’’ I assume

it means only pursuant to a U.N. Security

Council resolution can the President

authorize the use of

So it is one thing to affirm the general

right of self-defense, but then the

amendment takes it away with regard

to what we all acknowledge is the most

serious threat that Iraq constitutes to

the U.S., which is weapons of mass destruction.

This comes directly

from my experience as an attorney

and attorney general. If you are

saying ‘‘pursuant,’’ how else—I ask the

Senator from Michigan, do you believe,

under your amendment, and if there is

no resolution of the United Nations regarding

destruction of weapons of mass

destruction of Iraq, that the President

could authorize the use of force?

No. I think I will

just finish because I am taking Senator

BIDEN’s time.

I am reassured but still puzzled about

why you then have the second part of

your amendment, I say to Senator

LEVIN. And it is this: If you believe you

are not saying the ‘‘only’’ way the

President can use America’s military

forces to disarm Iraq, then why do you

require a return to the Congress for

that authorization later?

It seems to me your affirmation of

self-defense is very broad, and in spelling

out the pursuant clause, you are

limiting it. If you are not, then your

language is effectively a nullity.

I thank my friend.

This exchange has clarified for me the

intentions of the amendment. If I may

briefly state it, you are saying the

President can only take—forgive me

for using the word ‘‘only,’’ but I will

clarify it—action against, can only use

the Armed Forces of the U.S. to take

action against the weapons of mass destruction

in Iraq without a U.N. resolution

if he determines the threat from

those weapons is imminent.

If he determines

the threat is not imminent, then he

cannot take action against those weapons

without the U.N. resolution, unless

he returns to the Senate.

Mr. President, I

ask that the Chair notify me when a

minute remains so I may terminate my

remarks.

Mr. President, I

rise to oppose, respectfully, the amendment

introduced by the Senator from

Illinois.

The underlying resolution, building

on 11 years in which the world community

has tried every way imaginable,

except war, to get Saddam Hussein to

keep the promises he made at the end

the gulf war to disarm, is a strong resolution.

This amendment would diminish

it, and in that sense it would also

diminish its effectiveness to convince

the United Nations to act so we do not

have to form our own international coalition.

In two regards, it also diminishes the

authority of the Commander in Chief,

as granted by our resolution, and does

so in a way that is far more restrictive

than most any authorizing resolution

for war or military action that I have

seen before.

First, it introduces the word ‘‘imminent’’

in place of the words ‘‘continuing

threat.’’ We say in our resolution

that the President may use the

Armed Forces of the United States in

order to defend the national security of

our country against the continuing

threat posed by Iraq. The Durbin

amendment would change that to the

imminent threat posed by Iraq’s weapons

of mass destruction.

In changing it to ‘‘imminent,’’ which

is a temporal term—it suggests time,

that something is about to happen

soon—it adds a qualification that I

think is unwarranted. In the totality of

Saddam Hussein’s evil administration,

weapons of mass destruction, ballistic

missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles,

there is a threat that is real to us, and

I am convinced will be used against the

American people unless we act, hopefully

through the United Nations, to

disarm him.

So while it might not be imminent in

the sense that he is about to use it

against us, in my opinion it is a ticking

time bomb. We do not know exactly

how many seconds or minutes or hours

are left on that timer. I don’t want the

President to be limited to an imminent

threat to use the power we are giving

him here.

Second, it limits that authority for

the President to act only in regard to

an imminent threat of weapons of mass

destruction.

The resolution we have introduced

provides two conditions under which

the President may use the Armed

Forces to defend the national security

of the United States against the continuing

threat posed by Iraq and to enforce

all relevant U.N. Security Council

resolutions regarding Iraq. This

harkens back to a colloquy I had with

Senator SPECTER of Pennsylvania yesterday.

It seems to me these two parts have

to be read in totality as modifying

each other. The resolutions that are

relevant in the U.N. Security Council

are to be enforced particularly in relationship

to the extent to which they

threaten the national security of the

United States. In doing this, we are expressing

our understanding that the

President is unlikely to go to war to

enforce a resolution of the United Nations

that does not significantly affect

the national security of the United

States.

We want to do what the Constitution

invites us to do. Congress is given the

authority under article I to declare

war. The President under article II is

the Commander in Chief. There is a

healthy tension there. It is up to Congress

to authorize and to the President

to act as Commander in Chief with the

latitude that authority gives him but

also with the accountability and responsibility

that authority gives him.

I have spent time looking at authorizing

resolutions for war or military

action from the past. The one that we

put together—although some of our

colleagues have described it, I think,

erroneously as a blank check—is quite

limited compared to the declaration of

war authorizing and directing the

President to employ the entire naval

and military forces of the United

States and the resources of the Government

to carry on war—this was in the

case of World War I—and to bring the

conflict to a successful termination, all

the resources of the country are hereby

pledged by the Congress of the United

States.

We have only one Commander in

Chief; 535 Members of Congress cannot

effectively conduct a war. We set the

parameters, as this resolution does. We

authorize. But it is the President ultimately

who carries out and serves as

our Commander in Chief. That is what

our resolution does. That purpose

would be significantly altered and, I

say respectfully, weakened by the language

of the Senator from Illinois,

which is why I respectfully oppose his

amendment.

I yield the floor.

I thank my friend.

I agree it is rare we disagree, so I do so

with respect.

That is my point. I believe the threat

is real. The weapons of mass destruction

threat is real. Whether it is imminent

or not, I do not know.

As I said, the analogy that comes to

mind is of a bomb on a timer. I don’t

know whether the timer is set to go off

in a day or a year. But because the

danger is so real, I don’t want to establish

the standard of imminence before

the United Nations or the President of

the United States can act to eliminate

the danger.

Mr. President,

what weapons, exactly, does Saddam

Hussein have, and what could he do

with them? When we are talking about

this dangerous dictator, that is not a

hypothetical question. We can see what

he has done already with the chemicals

he has developed. We don’t have to

imagine; we need only extrapolate.

Saddam Hussein not only has large

and growing stockpiles of chemical and

biological weapons. He alone among

the dictators of the world has shown a

willingness to use them.

In the 1980s Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi

troops repeatedly used poison gas, including

mustard gas and the nerve

agent sarin, against Iranian soldiers.

And Saddam has repeatedly attacked

Kurds in the north with chemical

weapons, namely nerve agents and

mustard gas, the most horrifying single

attack coming in Halabja in 1988.

It is one thing to see nations accumulate

dangerous weapons for purely

deterrent and defensive purposes. It is

another entirely to see a dictator develop

such weapons and deploy them to

murder opponents of his regime and

wage offensive war against a neighbor.

That is why we must look with special

scrutiny on Saddam’s stockpiles.

When the U.N. inspectors were forced

out of Iraq in 1998, here is what was unaccounted

for: up to 360 tons of bulk

chemical warfare agents, including one

and a half tons of VX nerve agent; up

to 3,00 tons of precursor chemicals;

growth media sufficient to produce

26,000 liters of anthrax spores; and over

30,000 special munitions for delivery of

chemical and biological agents.

Those are just the leftovers that we

know about. Then add to that all the

deadly weapons that Saddam has been

cooking up over the last 11 years. We

know Iraq continues to produce chemical

agents for chemical weapons. We

know Saddam has rebuilt previously

destroyed production plants across

Iraq. We know he has retained the key

personnel formerly engaged in the

chemical weapons program. He has

mustard gas, VX nerve agent, and a

range of other chemical weapons.

The record repeats itself with biological

weapons. Intelligence shows us

that production has continued. Facilities

formerly used for biological weapons

have been rebuilt. Equipment has

been purchased. And Saddam has retained

the personnel who worked on it

before the gulf war. Indeed, UNSCOM

found that Iraq was working to build

mobile biological weapons facilities

which are easier to conceal. It appears

that they now have such facilities. The

biological agents we believe Iraq can

produce include anthrax, botulinum,

toxin, aflatoxin and ricin.

Perhaps we recite the litany, ‘‘chemical,

biological, working on nuclear,’’

so often that it loses some of its meaning.

British Prime Minister Tony Blair

has warned against us developing a

kind of ‘‘word fatigue’’ when it comes

to these weapons, and I take that warning

to heart.

‘‘New Yorker’’ writer Jeffrey Goldberg

has traveled to the region and

done significant reporting on Saddam’s

capabilities and his intentions—on his

deadly weapons and his brutal will. Let

me read a piece Mr. Goldberg wrote in

the online magazine Slate that puts

Saddam’s possession of at least one of

these toxins in sharp relief. I quote:

Richard Spertzel, who was the chief

biological weapons inspector for

UNSCOM, told me that aflatoxin is ‘‘a

devilish weapon. From a moral standpoint,

aflatoxin is the cruelest weapons,

it means watching children die

slowly of liver cancer.’’

Spertzel went on to say that, to his

knowledge, Iraq is the only country

ever to weaponize aflatoxin.

That is why every day this man remains

in power is a day of danger for

the American people, the Iraqi people,

and, indeed, the people of the world.

Let me give you one more example

that is as disturbing as aflatoxin. It is

botulinum toxin, the cause of botulism,

which comes from bacteria found in the

soil. After the gulf war, United Nations

weapons inspectors found that Iraq had

produced tons of botulinum toxin,

some of it loaded into missiles and

bombs. Let me repeat. Years ago, inspectors

found tons, some of it

weaponized. So we know Saddam has

experience with this weapon.

For smallpox, there is a vaccine. Anthrax

and other bacterial agents can be

treated with antibiotics. But botulism

is a toxin, a poisonous chemical made

by bacteria. Let than a handful of pure

botulinum toxin, evenly dispersed in an

aerosol, would be enough to kill more

than a million people. The only treatment

for botulism poisoning is an antitoxin

made from horse serum, and it

only works about half the time.

There is a horror story for every biological

or chemical agent in this man’s

arsenal. I don’t need to go through

them all. We only need to understand

that these horror stories could come

true if we do not confront Saddam’s devious

designs.

Some insist, and I don’t understand

this claim, that chemical and biological

weapons aren’t all that troubling.

They say we need only really worry

about nuclear weapons.

Given what I have just explained, I

think that is a dangerous assumption.

But assume for a moment that Saddam

has no chemical weapons and no biological

weapons. Would there be cause

for forceful United Nations action, and,

failing that, American military action?

I say, yes, without a doubt.

There is now a consensus belief that

Saddam could have an atomic weapon

within months of acquiring fissile material.

Based on the best estimates, his

regime could manufacture the fuel

itself within as little as 3 years. There

is no way to measure now long it might

take Saddam to acquire the fuel from

an outside source. He could be attempting

to do so as we speak. Indeed, it

would be naive to assume otherwise.

This leads to a critical question, and

perhaps the threshold question in the

debate. How long do my fellow Senators

suggest we wait? Until we know,

beyond dispute, if there is ever such

evidence beyond dispute, that Saddam

is 1 month away from obtaining a nuclear

weapon and the means to deliver

it? Until we know beyond dispute that

he is a week away? Or perhaps we

should wait until he has it?

In 1996, the International Atomic Energy

Agency, IAEA, reported that Iraq

had all the materials for a bomb except

for the fissile material itself—either

plutonium or highly enriched uranium.

It is now 6 years later.

The debate about whether Saddam is

an ‘‘imminent’’ threat is an interesting

one. What better defines imminence

than the facts that I have just outlined?

In fact, we must admit that the only

conclusive proof of imminence could

come in the hindsight, when innocents

are sorting through the rubble and

counting the injured or the dead. As

National Security Advisor Condaleeza

Rice said, the smoking gun could be a

mushroom cloud. Or add to that a yellow

cloud of mustard gas, an invisible

cloud of sarin gas, or the slow and silent

spread of smallpox.

I know, despite all this evidence,

much of which is beyond dispute, some

say, ‘‘There is no new evidence.’’

I have two answers to that. One, we

don’t need new evidence. The existing

evidence of his capabilities and intent

is more than enough to paint a poisonous

picture.

Two, there is, in fact, new evidence.

For instance, the fact that, once acquiring

fissile material, Saddam will be

just months of developing a nuclear

weapon, is new. And it underlines the

urgency of defanging this dictator immediately.

In fact, here is a brief review what we

know about what Saddam has done

since the departure of the U.N. weapons

inspections in 1998. British Prime

Minister Tony Blair laid this out to the

Parliament last month.

Since 1998, we know that Saddam has

sought or attempted to buy: specialized

vacuum pumps, the type needed for the

gas centrifuge to enrich uranium; an

entire magnet production lien of the

type for use in the motors and top

bearings of gas centrifuges; dual use

products such as Anhydrous Hydrogen

Fluoride and fluoride gas; a filament

winding machine, which can be used to

manufacture carbon fiber gas centrifuge

rotors; 60,000 or more specialized

aluminum tubes, which are subject

to strict controls due to their potential

use in the construction of gas centrifuges.

And Saddam has been trying to buy

significant quantities of uranium,

though we do not know whether he has

been successful. Key personnel from his

old nuclear weapons program are at

work again. Iraq claims that this is for

a civil nuclear power program but it

has no nuclear powerplants.

We can search for the most innocuous

possible explanation, of each and

every disturbing piece of evidence, or

we can look realistically at the totality

of the evidence.

And what about delivery systems?

Iraq is supposed to only have limited

missile capability for conventional

weaponry. But we know that a significant

number of longer-range missiles

were concealed from the previous inspectors,

including up to 20 extended

range Scud missiles. We know that

2001, Iraq’s plans entered a new stage

and that now, the regime’s development

of weapons with a range over 600

miles. Hundreds of key personnel are

working on the delivery systems.

The danger will not abate unless we

make it abate. it will only grow. And

we will be forced to simply wait and

see how, when, and against whom Saddam

will use these weapons.

What more do we need to know?

Some say that removing Saddam

Hussein from power would compromise

the wider war against terrorism. But to

me, the two are inextricably linked.

First, remember that Iraq under Saddam

is one of only seven nations in the

world to be designated by our State Department

as a state sponsor of terrorism.

He provides aid, funding, and

training to terrorists who have killed

Americans and others. He hosted the

Abu Nidal Organization, whose leader

was found dead in Baghdad in August.

He gives money to the families of Palestinian

suicide bombers.

Second, Saddam himself meets the

definition of a terrorist, someone who

attacks civilians to achieve a political

purpose. He has done so repeatedly

against the Kurds in the north of Iraq,

as well as against the Shi’a in the

south. If he is willing to kill thousands

of Iraqis, how many Americans or Europeans

do we think he considers expendable?

Third, though the relationship between

al-Qaida and Saddam’s regime is

a subject of intense debate within the

intelligence community, we do have

evidence of meetings between Iraqi officials

and leaders of al-Qaida, and

some testimony that Iraqi agents

helped train al-Qaida operatives to use

chemical and biological weapons. We

also know that senior leaders of al-

Qaida have been and are now harbored

in Iraq.

It is not speculation to suggest that

Iraq might pass chemical, biological,

or nuclear weapons to terrorists. It is

realism.

There are other state sponsors of terrorism,

all of which pose serious dangers

to the security of America and the

world.

But Saddam’s is the only regime that

combines a record of supporting terrorists

with a history of killing and torturing

dissidents, ambitions to dominate

his region, growing stockpiles of

chemical and biological weapons and a

willingness to use them. That is why

the danger he poses rises above the rest

on the topography of terror.

In my view, if we remove his pernicious

influence from the Middle East

and free the Iraqi people to determine

their own destiny, we will transform

the politics of the region, and advance

the war against terrorism, not set it

back as some have suggested.

In April 1917, in requesting a congressional

declaration to enter what was

then known as the Great War, Woodrow

Wilson said, ‘‘We act without animus,

not in enmity toward a people or with

the desire to bring any injury or disadvantage

upon them, but only in

armed opposition to an irresponsible

government which has thrown aside all

considerations of humanity and of

right and is running amuck.’’

The same can be said if and when we

must confront Saddam’s brutal regime.

We will not be fighting the Iraqi people.

Our goal, to the contrary, will be

to liberate the Iraqi people from tyranny

even as we remove the threat

from this rabid regime.

But we must prove that good and decent

intent not only on the day we

commit arms, if we must, on the day

we win. We must prove our commitment

to building a better nation for

the Iraqi people on the day after the

day after, and the day after that, when

we will face, and help the Iraqi people

to face, the broad range of humanitarian,

economic, diplomatic, and political

problems that will no doubt

present themselves.

The wars we wage are measured by

the quality of the peace that follows.

I know that some fear the future of

Iraq post-Saddam. They fear the risks,

the responsibilities, and the costs, so

much that those fears of tomorrow lead

them to justify inaction today. To me,

post-Saddam Iraq is not a burden to be

shunned but an opportunity to be

seized. It must become a signal to the

world, particularly the Islamic world,

of our Nation’s best intentions.

Indeed, post-Suddam Iraq will be a

test of America and our values. We

have barely earned a passing grade on

our first test, in post-Taliban Afghanistan.

We cannot afford to scrape and

slip by again, because this time the

stakes are higher, the stage larger, and

the consequences of failure even more

dire.

How do we lay the foundation for a

civil and open society after the fighting

stops and the likely celebrations in

the streets subside?

First, we must we invest in Iraq’s security.

Some will be tempted to shortchange

our post-Saddam commitment

by whittling down a security presence

to the smallest possible size we think

we can get away with, or by pulling our

forces out the first open window.

But we must learn from Afghanistan,

where, despite a brilliant military victory

and early movements toward a

stable and civil society, some big mistakes

have been made.

Perhaps due to the Bush administration’s

stated aversion to nation building,

we failed to establish a peacekeeping

presence strong enough or geographically

wide enough to tame the

factionalism and ethnic conflict that

have plagued Afghanistan for years. We

failed to get ready to deal with the decrepit

state of the nation’s infrastructure

caused by the long civil war that

preceded our involvement. And, though

our nations assisted us in our military

victory, we did not leverage their investment

to give them sufficient stake

in a responsibility in a long-term

peace.

As a result, the situation on the

ground in Afghanistan is tenuous

today. Warlords control the countryside.

Hamid Karzai’s rule in Kabul is

uncertain. His ministers have been assassinated.

Karzai himself came within

a hair’s breath of assassination. Have

we lost the peace? No. But the current

instability can, if left to fester, give

rise to terrorism. oppression, and civil

war.

It is not too late to correct our

course. That is why Senator Hagel and

I have sponsored the Afghanistan Freedom

Support Act of 2002, currently before

the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee. The bill would commit to

the country’s stability, security, and

democratic development by investing

$2.5 billion over 4 years in economic,

political, and humanitarian assistance,

including a half billion dollars toward

an enterprise fund for business development

and job creation and $300 million

in military and security assistance for

police training and crime control. It

would also urge President Bush to expand

the international security force

beyond Kabul, and, if that decision

were made, would authorize $1 billion

over the next two years to make that

possible. This is extremely important

legislation that deserves broad legislative

and public support.

Now we must hear from the administration

that they are ready with specific

plans for Iraq that will not repeat

the mistakes of Afghanistan.

In fact, we have to face the fact that

the best-case military scenario—the

rapid collapse of the Iraqi military and

the swift capture or elimination of

Saddam—would also present the most

challenging security scenario.

The three most immediate security

objectives will be securing all chemical,

biological and nuclear weapons

sites and relevant personnel, tracking

down Saddam’s remaining secret police,

and preventing potential Iranian

military interference.

Simultaneously, among the Iraqi

people at large, U.S. forces must be

ready immediately to shift gears to

post-conflict operations, helping to restore

order and handling humanitarian

emergencies. Despite its tremendous

training and talent, our military needs

more specialized teams to take on this

crucial job.

The administration should also work

with non-governmental organizations

to recruit Iraqi-American and other

Arab-American volunteers who can

help peacekeepers and humanitarian

organizations communicate with the

Iraqi people, distribute supplies, assist

in healthcare delivery, and do other

critical jobs. A similar volunteer program

worked in the Balkans and can

work again in Iraq.

Like the military campaign itself,

stabilizing post-Saddam Iraq and tending

to the Iraqi people will be aided

dramatically if the United States is

part of a international coalition, especially

one that includes Muslim and

Arab nations. That will make clear to

Iraqis and the world that our enemy is

Saddam and not the Iraqi people, and

just as Saddam is a threat to the

world, securing and rebuilding Iraq is

the duty of the world.

The bottom line is this: While Afghanistan’s

growing instability is deeply

troubling, allowing post-Saddam

Iraq, which abuts Syria and Iran, Saudi

Arabia and Jordan, Kuwait and Turkey,

to fall into civil war or into the

hands of another dictator would be disastrous.

If post-Saddam Iraq unravels,

as Afghanistan is at risk of doing, so

will the credibility and the effectiveness

of our wider war against terrorism.

And we will be that much closer

to a global civilization war.

Once security and stability are established

in post-Saddam Iraq, we must

begin to establish the foundation for

democratic governance and the rule of

law. I am pleased that the Bush administration

has begun bringing key opposition

groups together to lay what a

foundation for an honest, effective, and

representative government. Iraq is a

divided nation, with at least three key

regions and three key religious, ethnic,

and political factions. But let’s be

clear. Post-Saddam Iraqi governance

will take more than a couple of conference

calls to get right.

And we must be very careful here.

Our goal is not replacing Baghdad with

New York on the Tigris. We do not

want an American client state, and we

can’t expect a democracy that overnight

looks exactly like ours. We must

be realistic. This process will require

the sustained guidance, partnership,

and investment of our nation and our

allies, working with the Iraqi people.

The war against terrorism, including

this effort to disarm Iraq, is like no

other war we have waged.

If we are true to our principles, we

can again make the world a safer and

better place, not only for us Americans

but for people in Iraq and throughout

the Arab and Muslim worlds, who deserve

the freedom and opportunity that

we declared at the birth of our Nation

226 years ago: the endowment each

human being receives at birth from our

Creator.